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This Symposium asks the question “Is the United States a 
Christian nation?”  The answer must be a resounding no.  The 
country is not now, never has been, and never should be a Christian 
nation as a matter of law.   
In 1791, in the Treaty of Tripoli, the United States declared, 
“[t]he government of the United States is not in any sense founded 
on the Christian religion.”1  Proposals have been made to amend 
the United States Constitution to make it a Christian nation, but 
never have these attracted sufficient support to be seriously 
considered.  In 1864, the National Reform Association proposed 
amending the Constitution: “humbly acknowledging Almighty God 
as the source of all authority and power in civil government, the 
Lord Jesus Christ as the ruler among nations, and his revealed will 
as the supreme law of the land, in order to constitute a Christian 
government.”2  In 1950, there was a proposed constitutional 
* Dean and Jesse H. Choper Distinguished Professor of Law, University
of California, Berkeley School of Law.  Many of the ideas in this essay are 
drawn from my recent book, co-authored with Howard Gillman, THE RELIGION 
CLAUSES: THE CASE FOR SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE (2020).   
1. Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the United States of America
and the Bey and Subjects of Tripoli of Barbary, art. 11, U.S.-Tripoli, Jan. 3, 
1797, 8 Stat. 154. 
2. Amending the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 1864), https://www.ny-
times.com/1864/02/02/archives/amending-the-constitution.html 
[perma.cc/XM92-JEM3]. 
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amendment that would have said that the Constitution “devoutly 
recognizes the authority and law of Jesus Christ, saviour [sic] and 
ruler of nations, through whom we are bestowed the blessings of 
liberty.”3  The absence of significant support for these proposed 
constitutional amendments is revealing that there are some, but a 
minority, who see it as desirable to make the United States legally 
a Christian nation. 
The language of the United States being a Christian nation has 
its strongest support from a unanimous Supreme Court opinion, in 
1892, where Justice David Brewer, writing for a unanimous Court, 
declared that “this is a Christian nation.”4  Justice Brewer’s opinion 
relied on his view of history and on one provision of the 
Constitution:  Article 1, Section 7, which eliminates Sundays from 
the ten-day period provided for the President to consider a bill 
before signing it or returning it to Congress with his veto.5  This 
seeming recognition of a religious practice, Sunday worship, into 
the Constitution led Justice Brewer to conclude that America was 
a Christian nation. 
Thankfully, this language from Justice Brewer’s opinion has 
faded into obscurity and has even been expressly rejected by 
subsequent justices.6  To be sure, the theme of the United States 
being a Christian country continues to be expressed, especially by 
the religious right.  James Dobson, head of Focus on the Family, 
declared: “The United States was established as a Christian nation 
by Christian people.”7  But there is no indication that even the most 
3. Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Rec-
ognizing the Authority and Law of Jesus Christ: Hearing on S. J. Res. 87 Before 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong. 63 (1954).  The full proposed amend-
ment read, “[t]his nation devoutly recognizes the authority and law of Jesus 
Christ, saviour [sic] and ruler of nations, through whom are bestowed the 
blessings of Almighty God.”  Id. 
4. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).
5. Id. at 470 (citing U.S. CONST. art I, § 7).
6. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(calling Church of the Holy Trinity an “aberration[ ]” (citing Church of the Holy 
Trinity, 465 U.S. at 471)); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 717–18 (1984) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (calling Justice Brewer’s declaration “arrogant” (cit-
ing Church of the Holy Trinity, 465 U.S. at 471)).  
7. James Dobson, America is a Christian Nation, DR. JAMES DOBSON (July
14, 2017), https://www.drjamesdobson.org/broadcasts/america-christian-na-
tion [perma.cc/S6DZ-XCFS]. 
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conservative, originalist justices on the Supreme Court accept this 
characterization as a matter of constitutional law. 
My thesis is that the United States is not a Christian nation as 
a matter of law and should never be considered one.  The laws of 
the country cannot embody Christianity or favor it over other 
religions.  It is firmly established that the government violates the 
Establishment Clause if it discriminates among religious groups. 
Such discrimination will be allowed only if strict scrutiny is met.8  
All of the Justices on the current Court, regardless of their theory 
of the establishment clause, adhere to this principle.  In Larson v. 
Valente, the Court declared that “the history and logic of the 
Establishment Clause [mean] that no State can ‘pass laws which 
aid one religion’ or that ‘prefer one religion over another.’”9 
But as a matter of social reality, it cannot be ignored that this 
is a country where over 200 million people identify as Christians.  
As a Jew, I often have the sense—especially during the December 
holiday season—that I am living in a Christian nation.  But as a 
matter of law, including constitutional law, the United States is a 
secular nation, not a Christian one.  This is crucial in a country with 
enormous religious pluralism, and many who profess no religious 
beliefs at all. 
In this Article, I make three points.  First, historically, the 
United States was not meant to be a Christian nation.  Second, as 
a matter of constitutional interpretation, the First Amendment 
should be interpreted to require a separation of church and state 
that would be incompatible with the United States being a 
Christian nation.  And finally, I fear that we have a majority of 
justices on the Supreme Court who reject the idea of separating 
church and state.  I do not believe that they will declare the United 
States officially to be a Christian nation, but I am afraid that is the 
lens through which they will decide cases. 
8. Steven G. Calabresi & Abe Salander, Religion and the Equal Protection
Clause 99–100 (Nw. U. Sch. of L., Faculty Working Paper No. 213, 2012). 
9. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (quoting Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)). 
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I. HISTORY DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLAIM OF THE UNITED STATES
BEING A CHRISTIAN NATION
I am not an originalist.10  I believe that the Constitution is a
living document that must be interpreted in light of history and 
modern needs.  But for those who are originalists, including 
Supreme Court justices, the evidence is overwhelming that the 
Constitution was not meant to create a Christian nation. 
The framers of the Constitution were deeply aware of the 
religious strife in other countries, including England, over a long 
period of time.  They very much wanted to avoid the conflict that 
inevitably comes with the government being aligned with a 
particular religion.11  Also, they saw themselves as part of the 
enlightenment where reason had replaced religion as the basis for 
decisions.12  They expressly rejected government-established 
religions and forced conformity.13  They chose, and ultimately wrote 
into the Constitution, the secularization of government and a 
commitment to religious tolerance.14  Those who framed the 
American Constitution insisted that the welfare of the people was 
best advanced, not by religious establishments and forced 
conformity to officially endorsed religions, but by the secularization 
of government authority and the toleration of diverse religious 
practitioners.15   
Quite importantly, there were no references in the Constitution 
to a Supreme Being, no authority given to Congress to legislate on 
matters of religion, and a prohibition against religious tests for 
10. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, WE THE PEOPLE: A PROGRESSIVE READING OF
THE CONSTITUTION FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 34–46 (2018); see also Er-
win Chemerinsky, The Philosophy That Makes Amy Coney Barrett So Danger-
ous, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/21/opin-
ion/supreme-court-amy-coney-barrett.html [perma.cc/3FYA-5C8V]. 
11. See JAMES T. HUTSON, RELIGION AND THE FOUNDING OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 59 (1998). 
12. See Derek H. Davis, Original Intent, THE FIRST AMEND. ENCYC. (2009),
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/823/original-intent 
[perma.cc/VWG8-XTAW] (last visited Apr. 6, 2021). 
13. See id.
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1; Id. c. 2.
15. See Saul K. Padover, The World of the Founding Fathers, 25 SOC. RES.
191, 211–14 (1958). 
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office.16  At the state level, at the time of the drafting and 
ratification of the Constitution, there still were vestiges of formal, 
government-authorized “established” religions, but state practices 
were quickly changing.17  An establishment of religion (in terms of 
direct tax aid for a favored church) was the practice in nine of the 
thirteen British colonies on the eve of the American Revolution, but 
by 1800 only three American states (New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, and Connecticut) had established churches.18  
These all faded relatively quickly in the early nineteenth century.19  
Some of the arguments associated with this transformation—
especially during Virginia’s multi-year debate about assessments in 
support of particular churches—became among the most important 
and revered documents in all of American history.20  They certainly 
are regarded as foundational in understanding what the framers 
intended with the religion clauses in the First Amendment.21 
The role of Roger Williams, for whom this law school is named, 
must be recognized in creating religious freedom in the United 
States.  He sided with the Puritans who insisted on a complete 
separation with the Anglican Church.  But rather than replace the 
Anglican Church with a more purified church, Williams advocated 
for the complete separation of church and state.22  Exiled from 
Massachusetts in 1635, he settled in what is now Providence, Rhode 
Island and founded the Rhode Island Colony, which declared in its 
charter: 
No person within the said colony, at any time hereafter, 
shall be any ways molested, punished, disquieted, or called 
in question, for any differences in opinion in matters of 
religion, and do not actually disturb the peace of our said 
colony; but that all and every person and persons may, from 
time to time, and at all times hereafter, freely and fully 
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1 (Establishment Clause); Id. art. VI, cl. 3 (No
Religious Test Clause); see generally id. 
17. See HUTSON, supra note 11, at 60.
18. John K. Wilson, Religion Under the State Constitutions, 1776–1800, 32
J. CHURCH & ST. 753, 754 (1990).
19. See id. at 759.
20. See id. at 757.
21. See id. at 758.
22. See id.
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have and enjoy his and their own judgments and 
consciences, in matters of religious concernments.23   
His goal, as he famously put it in 1643, was to construct “a wall of 
Separation between the Garden of the Church and the Wildernes 
[sic] of the world.”24 
Williams’s work, The Bloudy Tenent25 of Persecution, for Cause 
of Conscience, Discussed in a Conference between Truth and Peace, 
was published in England in 1644—the same year John Milton 
published Areopagitica to make the case for more liberty of 
expression (especially for Protestant nonconformists)26—while he 
was trying to convince English authorities to grant Rhode Island a 
charter.27  The book was so radical that Parliament ordered every 
copy burned.28  But it had a substantial influence throughout the 
colonies.29  In it he lamented “the blood of so many hundred 
thousand souls of protestants and papists, spilt in the Wars of 
present and former ages, for their respective Consciences”—noting 
that the spilling of this blood “is not required nor accepted by Jesus 
Christ the Prince of Peace”—and argued that the “[e]nforced 
uniformity” of religion in any “civil state . . . is the greatest occasion 
of civil war, ravishing of conscience, persecution of Christ Jesus in 
his servants, and of the hypocrisy and destruction of millions of 
23. CHARTER OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS (1663), re-
printed in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND 
ORIGINS 32, 32-33 (Neil H. Cogan et al. eds., 2d ed. 2015). 
24. ROGER WILLIAMS, MR. COTTON’S LETTER LATELY PRINTED, EXAMINED, 
AND ANSWERED (1644), reprinted in 1 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER 
WILLIAMS 313, 392 (Rueben Aldridge Guild & James Hammond Trumbull eds., 
1963). 
25. “Tenent” is an obsolete spelling of the word “tenet.”  See Tenet,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tenet 
[perma.cc/33Y9-9AXS] (last visited Apr. 6, 2021). 
26. See generally JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (Cambridge U. Press 1916)
(1644). 
27. Samuel L. Caldwell, Preface to ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY TENENT
OF PERSECUTION (1644), reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER 
WILLIAMS iii, iii (Samuel L. Caldwell ed., 1963). 
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souls.”30  In the middle of this bloody century, and at the dawn of 
the English Civil War, Williams’s advice was that a “firm and 
lasting peace” could only be procured by the “permission of other 
consciences and worships than a state professes.”31 
The Constitution, written in 1787, was in accord with this view. 
It makes no mention of religion, let alone a specific religion, as a 
basis for governing authority.  The first words of the Preamble, “We 
the People,” make clear that the sovereign is the people; the 
authority of government is derived from it and not from God.32  
There is no authority given to Congress to legislate as to matters of 
religion.33  In fact, the only explicit mention of religion in the text 
of the first seven Articles of the Constitution is a rejection of it as a 
basis for holding office.34  Article VI, Section 3 provides:   
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and 
the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all 
executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States 
and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or 
Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious 
Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office 
or public Trust under the United States.35 
During this period, debates about state-established or state-
supported religions were more controversial, although popular 
support for this practice was weakening.  At the time of the 
Declaration of Independence, Virginia had established a range of 
practices in support of Anglicanism, but they were quickly being 
erased.36   The legislature repealed laws making it a crime to 
subvert Anglicanism and failing to attend church.37  In the 1780s 
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson—no fans of the “age of 
Constantine” that resulted in “millions of innocent men, women, 
and children . . . [being] burnt, tortured, fined, and imprisoned” 
30. WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 1, 3–4 (spelling modernized).
31. Id. at 4 (spelling modernized).
32. U.S. CONST. pmbl.  I explain the importance of “We the People” as the
first words of the Preamble in CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 60–64. 
33. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
34. See U.S. CONST. art. I–VII.
35. Id. art. VI, § 3.
36. HOWARD GILLMAN & ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE RELIGION CLAUSES 31
(2020). 
37. Id.
2021] IS THIS A CHRISTIAN NATION? 411 
with no resulting consensus on matters of faith38—engaged in a 
lengthy campaign for religious freedom in Virginia.39  Their 
campaign ended with the passage of the Virginia Act for Religious 
Freedom, the law that disestablished the Anglican Church.40   
The controversy in Virginia began in 1784 when Patrick Henry 
proposed that a property tax be levied on all citizens to support 
ministers of recognized Christian sects, with each property owner 
to specify the denomination to which he wished his tax directed.41  
An amendment was initially passed to drop the word “Christian” so 
that the act would support all religious instruction, but Benjamin 
Harrison, the former governor, had the change reversed.42  The 
purpose of the bill was to keep the Christian ministry, particularly 
the Episcopalian clergy, active and solvent.43 
The next year Madison drafted the Memorial and 
Remonstrance against Religious Assessments arguing that the 
religion “of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience 
of every man” and therefore, “[i]t is the duty of every man to render 
to the Creator such homage and such only as he believes to be 
acceptable to him.”44   He went on: 
Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to 
profess and to observe the Religion which we believe to be 
of divine origin, we cannot deny an equal freedom to those 
whose minds have not yet yielded to the evidence which has 
convinced us.  If this freedom be abused, it is an offence 
against God, not against man . . . .45  
In critiquing the proposed law, Madison echoed Locke’s argument 
in A Letter Concerning Toleration advocating for a separation of 
38. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 167–68 (Lilly &
Wait 1832) (1787). 
39. GILLMAN & CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36, at 31.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. THOMAS BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA 108
(1977). 
43. Id. at 109.
44. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious As-
sessments (ca. June 20, 1785), NAT’L. ARCHIVES, https://founders.ar-
chives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0163 [perma.cc/98YZ-3XR6] (last vis-
ited Apr. 6, 2021). 
45. Id.
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civil authority and religious authority: 
[T]he Bill implies either that the Civil Magistrate is a
competent Judge of Religious Truth; or that he may employ 
Religion as an engine of civil policy.  The first is an arrogant 
pretension falsified by the contradictory opinions of Rulers 
in all ages, and throughout the world: the second an 
unhallowed perversion of the means of salvation. 
. . . . 
 . . . [The Bill] will destroy that moderation and harmony 
which the forbearance of our laws to intermeddle with 
Religion has produced among its several sects.  Torrents of 
blood have been spilt in the old world, by vain attempts of 
the secular arm, to extinguish Religious discord, by 
proscribing all difference in Religious opinion.  Time has at 
length revealed the true remedy.  Every relaxation of 
narrow and rigorous policy, wherever it has been tried, has 
been found to assuage the disease.46  
Importantly, Madison was not merely advocating a principle of 
“equality” or “no favoritism” among Protestant sects.  Rather, he 
was urging a more general principle of “noncognizance,” meaning 
that the civil authority can take no notice of such matters and 
should assert no jurisdiction over a person’s faith and conscience.47
As such, his views presage arguments during debates about the 
First Amendment regarding laws that “respect an Establishment of 
religion.”48 
Virginia politicians waited until the 1786 state election before 
finalizing a decision on these debates.  The election brought a strong 
anti-assessment contingent into the legislature, and the resulting 
“Act for Establishing Religious Freedom,” drafted by Jefferson, 
disestablished the Anglican Church in Virginia.49  In so doing the 
Act declared:  
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. See Vincent Phillip Munoz, James Madison’s Principle of Religious
Liberty, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 17, 21–24 (2003). 
49. A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, H.D. 82, 1779 Gen. Assemb.
(Va. 1786), NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jeffer-
son/01-02-02-0132-0004-0082 [perma.cc/JD74-PX8K] (last visited Apr. 6, 
2021). 
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[T]he impious presumption of legislators and rulers, . . .
who, being themselves but fallible and uninspired men,
have assumed dominion over the faith of others, setting up
their own opinions and modes of thinking as the only true
and infallible, and as such endeavoring to impose them on
others, hath established and maintained false religions
over the greatest part of world, and through all time; that
to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and
tyrannical; . . . that our civil rights have no dependence on
our religious opinions, more than our opinions in physics or
geometry; . . . and finally, that truth is great, and will
prevail if left to herself, that she is the proper and sufficient
antagonist to error, and has nothing to fear from the
conflict, unless by human interposition disarmed of her
natural weapons, free argument and debate, errors ceasing
to be dangerous when it is permitted freely to contradict
them.50
The bill was one of the three accomplishments Jefferson insisted be 
mentioned on his tombstone, along with authoring the Declaration 
of Independence and founding the University of Virginia.51  
 Christianity obviously was, by far, the dominant religion in the 
United States when the Constitution was written, and ever since.52
But the framers made no effort to institutionalize this in the 
Constitution.  If there is an original meaning to be found concerning 
religion and the Constitution, it can be summarized in two 
principles.  First, the new American republic rejected the centuries-
old European practice of linking government authority to a formal 
religious tradition or sect.  Second, although the government would 
have a secular identity, the Constitution also would recognize that 
50. Id.
51. Jefferson’s Gravestone, MONTICELLO, https://www.monticello.org/site
/research-and-collections/jeffersons-gravestone [perma.cc/W574-4JAG] (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2021). 
52. See Religion in America: U.S. Religious Data, Demographics and Sta-
tistics, PEW RES. CTR., https://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/ 
[https://perma.cc/JRG7-TGMK] (last visited Apr. 6, 2021); Mark Hall, Did 
America Have a Christian Founding?, THE HERITAGE FOUND.  (June 7, 2011), 
https://www.heritage.org/political-process/report/did-america-have-christian-
founding [perma.cc/6X9M-JQJ9]. 
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people would be free to exercise the religion of their choice.  Both of 
these precepts are flatly inconsistent with the idea that the United 
States was meant to be, as a legal matter, a Christian nation.  These 
two principles came to be embodied in the religion clauses of the 
First Amendment, which prohibit any law respecting the 
establishment of religion and protect the free exercise of religion.53 
II. THE CONSTITUTION SHOULD BE INTERPRETED TO SEPARATE
CHURCH AND STATE
As a non-originalist, the question is how should the religion
clauses of the First Amendment—the Establishment Clause and 
the Free Exercise Clause—best be interpreted in light of the text of 
these provisions, the original understanding, the history of the 
United States, precedent, and modern social needs?  I am firmly 
convinced that these clauses should be interpreted to ensure, to the 
greatest extent possible, the separation of church and state. 
Government should be secular and should not be identified with 
Christianity or any particular religion, or religion over secularism. 
Beyond an originalist argument for this conclusion, why should 
the Constitution be interpreted in this way?  First, this approach 
prevents the coercion that is inherent when the government 
becomes aligned with religion.  World history, to say nothing of the 
history of this country, shows us that inherently, when the 
government becomes aligned with religion, people feel coerced to 
participate.54  As the Court explained in Engel v. Vitale, “the 
indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to 
the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.”55  
This is especially the case in the context of public schools. 
Certainly, this is why the Supreme Court has repeatedly for almost 
a half century held that prayer, even voluntary prayer, does not 
belong in public schools.56  Students who are from minority 
53. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
54. See, e.g., HENRY KAMEN, THE SPANISH INQUISITION: AN HISTORICAL
REVISION 10–11 (1997) (discussing the status of conversos¾Jews or Muslims 
who had been forced to convert to Christianity¾and the continuing pressure 
to conform in fourteenth-century Spain). 
55. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
56. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (holding that the
Establishment Clause forbids prayer at public school graduations); Wallace v. 
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 61 (1985) (striking down a statute authorizing “moments 
of silence” at public schools as violating the Establishment Clause); Abington 
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religions, or who have no religious upbringing, feel enormous social 
pressure to participate in the prayers of their classmates rather 
than risk being ostracized and ridiculed.  This was exactly Justice 
Kennedy’s point in Lee v. Weisman, when the Court held that clergy 
who deliver prayers at public school graduations violate the First 
Amendment.57  Once the government becomes aligned with 
religion, coercion becomes so easy.  We have seen this at public 
universities.  Cadets at the Air Force Academy talk movingly about 
being forced to participate in Christian religious ceremonies, even 
if they are not Christians.58  This is the danger if church and state 
are not separate.  If the United States officially was deemed to be a 
Christian country, then those of different faiths inevitably would 
feel pressure to conform. 
Second, separating church and state—and rejecting that the 
United States is a Christian country—is the best way of ensuring 
that we can all feel that it is “our” government, whatever our 
religion or lack of religion.  If government becomes aligned with a 
particular religion or religions, or with some overarching religious 
traditions (e.g., Christian) over others (Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, or 
Santiera), those of other beliefs will be made to feel like outsiders, 
inherently alienated from the government that claims to represent 
us all.  Justice O’Connor captured this better than anyone in her 
writings for the Court.  She said that the Establishment Clause is 
there to make sure that none of us are led to feel that we are 
insiders or outsiders when it comes to our government.59  She wrote: 
“[e]ndorsement [of religion by the government] sends a message to 
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the 
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents 
that they are insiders . . . .”60 
If our government becomes aligned with religion or a particular 
Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) (finding that the Establish-
ment Clause barred reading Bible passages in public schools); Engel, 370 U.S. 
at 435 (holding that states may not compose official prayer to be read in public 
schools). 
57. Lee, 505 U.S. at 599.
58. Josh White, Intolerance Found at Air Force Academy, WASH. POST
(June 23, 2005), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti-
cle/2005/06/22/AR2005062200598_pf.html [perma.cc/3UQ6-895A]. 
59. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring). 
60. Id. at 688.
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religion, some of us are made to feel that we just do not belong in 
that place.  If there were a large Latin cross atop a city hall, those 
who were not part of religions that accept the cross as a religious 
symbol would feel that it was not “their” city government.  In the 
same way, how would one who does not accept God, or one who does 
not believe that there is one God, feel about walking into the Texas 
Supreme Court or the Texas State Capitol and seeing “I am the 
Lord, thy God,” and seeing underneath it, “Thou shalt have no other 
gods before me”?61  If we want all citizens to feel that the 
government is open for everyone, we need our government to be 
strictly secular—respectful of all, without signaling an alliance, 
public or secret, with just some. 
If the United States ever were to be deemed a Christian 
country, such as in a revival of Justice Brewer’s approach, all 
members of other religions or those who have no religious beliefs 
would feel like outsiders and lesser citizens.  That is exactly what 
the Establishment Clause should be interpreted to prevent. 
A third important reason to favor separation is that it is wrong 
to tax people to support the religion of others.  James Madison 
captured this best in Virginia, where he talked about why he 
believed that it was, in his words, “immoral” to tax people to support 
religions in which they did not believe.62  Each of us has our own 
religion, or maybe we decided that we do not have any religion, but 
should our tax dollars go to advance a religion in which we do not 
believe?  What if it is a religion that teaches things that we find 
abhorrent?  Certainly, we have the right to give our money to 
support any religion or any cause that we want, but it is wrong to 
be coerced to give our tax dollars to religions we do not believe in. 
That is why separation is best: it allows people to choose how to 
spend their money, rather than permitting the government to use 
it against their own wishes.  This does not deny that there are line-
drawing issues with regard to funding, some of which is discussed 
below.63  Not providing police and fire protection to houses of 
worship would present serious free exercise clause issues.  But nor 
does that mean that the government paying for everything else—
61. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (upholding a Ten
Commandments monument between the Texas State Capitol and the Texas 
Supreme Court). 
62. See Madison, supra note 44 (urging the Commonwealth of Virginia not
to enact a bill providing support to religious groups through the levy of a tax). 
63. See infra Part III.
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even salaries for clergy—should be permissible. 
Finally, keeping the government separate best protects 
religion.  America is the most religious and religiously diverse 
nation in the developed western world, and to a large extent this is 
due to the view that people have that the government will play no 
favorites, thus allowing all people of faith to worship without fear 
or oppression.  Roger Williams talked about this prior to the 
drafting of the Establishment Clause.64  He wanted to separate 
church and state not to safeguard the state from religion, but to 
protect religion from the state.65  The reality is that the more the 
government becomes involved in religion, the more the government 
will regulate religion and, consequently, the greater the danger is 
to religion.  There is also the danger of trivializing religion.  To say 
that a cross is just there for secular purposes—as in American 
Legion v. American Humanist Association—ignores how important 
the cross is as a religious symbol.66 
Separation is not hostile to religion.  Of course, any 
enforcement of the Establishment Clause will be seen by those who 
want a religious presence as hostility to religion.  But that view begs 
the question and assumes that a religious presence in government 
is permissible.  If the Constitution is seen as requiring separation 
of church and state, excluding religion is enforcing the view that 
the place for religion should be in the private realm.  Our 
government should be secular—for the sake of a less turbulent 
political system and for the sake of a diverse set of religious 
practitioners seeking a political context where their personal 
religious convictions will be respected. 
III. “THE TIMES ARE A CHANGIN’”:  THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
RELIGION CLAUSES
There are now likely six justices on the Supreme Court—John
Roberts, Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, Brett 
Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett—who reject the idea of a 
64. See JAMES P. BYRD, JR., THE CHALLENGES OF ROGER WILLIAMS 121–27
(2002) (“In the process of corrupting the church, Williams believed that Chris-
tendom had corrupted biblical exegesis by devising an interpretative method 
that supported the state’s claim to authority over religious matters.”). 
65. Id.
66. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2090 (2019) (up-
holding the constitutionality of a thirty-two-foot cross on public property). 
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separation of church and state.  They seek to provide much more 
protection for religion, including for religious beliefs to be a basis 
for violating laws of general applicability.67  I do not foresee their 
adopting Justice Brewer’s language that it is a Christian nation, 
but I expect that their rulings will consistently achieve the same 
results as if they held that explicitly.  They will give great latitude 
towards Christianity being part of government activities and the 
government giving financial support for Christianity.  At the same 
time, they will allow those who profess a religious objection to gay, 
lesbian, and transgender individuals to discriminate; these will 
likely be fundamentalist Christians. 
First, for these justices, very little will ever violate the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  To begin with, 
Justices Thomas and Gorsuch take the position that the 
Establishment Clause does not apply to state and local 
governments at all.68   For them, a state could declare Christianity, 
or a denomination within it, to be its official religion.69  Justice 
Thomas often has expressed the view that the Court was wrong in 
finding that the Establishment Clause applies to state and local 
governments.70  His view is that the Establishment Clause was 
meant to prevent the federal government from establishing 
churches that would have competed with existing state churches.71  
67. Michelle Boorstein, Religious conservatives hopeful new Supreme




68. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2264 (2020)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (Justice Gorsuch joining); see James R. Rogers, Incor-




70. See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 604–08 (2014)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Elk Grove 
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 46 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
the judgment); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 679 (2002) (Thomas, 
J., concurring); see also Richard F. Duncan, Justice Thomas and Partial Incor-
poration of the Establishment Clause: Herein of Structural Limitations, Liberty 
Interests, and Taking Incorporation Seriously, 20 REGENT U. L. REV. 39, 44–45 
(2007). 
71. See Galloway, 572 U.S. at 604–06; see also Newdow, 542 U.S. at 50–
51; Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. at 678-79. 
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This view, of course, would mean a dramatic change in the law as 
state and local governments would be completely unconstrained by 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
In his most recent expression of this, in 2020, in Espinoza v. 
Montana Department of Revenue, Justice Thomas was joined by 
Justice Gorsuch in declaring: “This understanding of the 
Establishment Clause is unmoored from the original meaning of the 
First Amendment.  As I have explained in previous cases, at the 
founding, the Clause served only to ‘protec[t] States, and by 
extension their citizens, from the imposition of an established 
religion by the Federal Government.’”72  But then Justice Thomas 
went even further in expressing the view that the government may 
embrace a particular religion: “Thus, the modern view, which 
presumes that States must remain both completely separate from 
and virtually silent on matters of religion to comply with the 
Establishment Clause, is fundamentally incorrect.  Properly 
understood, the Establishment Clause does not prohibit States 
from favoring religion.”73  Under this view, nothing a state or local 
government could do—including deeming itself to be a Christian 
city or state—would offend the Establishment Clause. 
In 1947, in Everson v. Board of Education, the Court 
unanimously held that the Establishment Clause applies to state 
and local governments.74  Not one justice questioned this until 
Clarence Thomas.  Now Neil Gorsuch has joined this view, and it is 
possible that Justice Amy Coney Barrett—both a self-avowed 
originalist and very conservative—could be a third vote.75 
But even for the conservative justices who do not go this far, 
they find little violates the Establishment Clause.  They believe 
that the Establishment Clause—the provision of the First 
Amendment prohibiting any law respecting the establishment of 
religion—should be interpreted to accommodate religious 
72. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2263 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (quoting Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. at 678) (emphasis Espinoza). 
73. Id. at 2264.
74. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1947) (the Court split five–
four on whether the buses to take children to and from school violated the Es-
tablishment Clause in favor of constitutionality). 
75. Tom McCarthy, Amy Coney Barrett is a constitutional ‘originalist’ – but
what does it mean?, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/us-news/2020/oct/26/amy-coney-barrett-originalist-but-what-does-it-
mean [perma.cc/XN97-8ACR].  
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participation in government and government support for religious 
institutions.76  Under their view, the government violates the 
Establishment Clause only if it coerces religious participation or 
discriminates among religions in the provision of benefits.77  Under 
this approach, the Establishment Clause is not violated by religious 
symbols on government property,78 or by religious observances at 
government functions,79 or by the government providing financial 
support to religious institutions even when it is used for religious 
indoctrination.80 
The ability of the government to favor Christianity over all 
other religions under their view is reflected in two recent Supreme 
Court decisions.  In Town of Greece v. Galloway, the Court held that 
it does not violate the Establishment Clause for a town board to 
begin virtually every meeting over a ten-year period with a prayer 
by a Christian minister.81  The Town of Greece is a suburb of 
Rochester, New York of about 100,000 people.82  Its town board 
opened meetings with a moment of silence until 1999 when the 
town supervisors initiated a policy change.83  The town began 
inviting ministers to begin meetings each month with a prayer.84  
From 1999 to 2007, the town invited exclusively Christian 
ministers, most of whom gave explicitly Christian prayers.85 
76. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The First Amendment, of course, says that
“Congress” may not do this.  In Everson v. Board of Education, the Court held 
that the Establishment Clause applies to state and local governments through 
its incorporation into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
330 U.S. 1 (1947).  It always has been assumed that the First Amendment 
applies to the President and to the federal courts, even though its text provides 
only a prohibition against “Congress.” 
77. See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 585–86 (2014).
78. See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n., 139 S. Ct 2067, 2090 (2019)
(upholding thirty-two-foot cross on government property). 
79. See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 585–86 (upholding Christian prayers
before Town Board meetings over a long period of time). 
80. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion) (opinion
by Justice Thomas holding that the government may provide aid to parochial 
schools even if it is used for religious instruction). 
81. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 585–86.
82. Id. at 570.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 571.
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In 2007, complaints were made to the Town Board about this 
and for four months clergy from other religions were invited.86  But 
then for the next eighteen months, the Town Board reverted to 
inviting only Christian clergy and their prayers were almost always 
Christian in their content.87 
The Court, in a five–four decision, held that the Town of Greece 
did not violate the Establishment Clause.88  The Court stressed the 
long history of prayers before legislative sessions, including 
explicitly Christian prayers, and said that its precedent “teaches 
. . . that the Establishment Clause must be interpreted ‘by reference 
to historical practices and understandings.’”89  The Court said that 
for it to require nonsectarian prayers would put the government 
and the courts unduly in the position of monitoring the content of 
the prayers delivered by others:  
To hold that invocations must be nonsectarian would force 
the legislatures that sponsor prayers and the courts that 
are asked to decide these cases to act as supervisors and 
censors of religious speech, a rule that would involve 
government in religious matters to a far greater degree 
than is the case under the town’s current practice of neither 
editing or approving prayers in advance nor criticizing 
their content after the fact.90 
The Court expressed great deference to the government in 
having prayers before legislative sessions and held: “[a]bsent a 
pattern of prayers that over time denigrate, proselytize, or betray 
an impermissible government purpose, a challenge based solely on 
the content of a prayer will not likely establish a constitutional 
violation.”91 
Justice Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment, which was joined in part by Justice 
Scalia.92  Writing for just himself, Justice Thomas reiterated his 
86. Id. at 572.
87. Id. at 611–12 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 565, 568 (majority opinion).
89. Id. at 576 (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 670
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)). 
90. Id. at 566.
91. Id. at 585.
92. Id. at 568.
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view, described above, that the Establishment Clause does not 
apply to state and local governments.93  In a part of the opinion 
joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas argued that the 
Establishment Clause is violated only if there is “actual legal 
coercion” to participate in religious activities.94 
Justice Kagan wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor.95  The dissent found that the 
Town Board violated the Establishment Clause by inviting 
virtually only Christian clergy over a long period of time and their 
usually delivering explicitly Christian prayers.96  Justice Kagan 
wrote: “the Town of Greece’s prayer practices violate that norm of 
religious equality—the breathtakingly generous constitutional idea 
that our public institutions belong no less to the Buddhist or Hindu 
than to the Methodist or Episcopalian.”97  Justice Kagan explicitly 
distinguished Marsh v. Chambers, which had allowed clergy-
delivered prayers before congressional sessions:  
The practice at issue here differs from the one sustained in 
Marsh because Greece’s town meetings involve 
participation by ordinary citizens, and the invocations 
given—directly to those citizens—were predominantly 
sectarian in content.  Still more, Greece’s Board did 
nothing to recognize religious diversity: In arranging for 
clergy members to open each meeting, the Town never 
sought (except briefly when this suit was filed) to involve, 
accommodate, or in any way reach out to adherents of non-
Christian religions.  So month in and month out for over a 
93. Id. at 608 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment).  Justice Alito also wrote a concurring opinion.  Id. at 592. 
94. Id. at 608 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). 
95. Id. at 615 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer also wrote a dissent-
ing opinion and stated: 
[T]he town of Greece failed to make reasonable efforts to include
prayer givers of minority faiths, with the result that, although it is a
community of several faiths, its prayer givers were almost exclusively
persons of a single faith.  Under these circumstances, I would affirm
the judgment of the Court of Appeals that Greece’s prayer practice
violated the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 615 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
96. Id. at 631 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 615–16 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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decade, prayers steeped in only one faith, addressed toward 
members of the public, commenced meetings to discuss 
local affairs and distribute government benefits. In my 
view, that practice does not square with the First 
Amendment’s promise that every citizen, irrespective of 
her religion, owns an equal share in her government.98 
The practical effect of Town of Greece v. Galloway is that there 
will be Christian prayers before legislative sessions in many parts of 
the country.  A subsequent case makes clear that the Court will allow 
Christian religious symbols on government property.  In American 
Legion v. American Humanist Association, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of a thirty-two-foot cross that sits on public 
property in Prince George’s County, Maryland.99  The cross was 
erected in 1920 as a memorial to those who died in military service 
in World War I.100 
The Court in a seven–two decision rejected the constitutional 
challenge.101  Justice Alito wrote, in part for the majority and in 
part for a plurality, and stressed that although a cross is a religious 
symbol, it also has other non-religious significance, including as a 
memorial for war dead.102  He explained:  
The cross came into widespread use as a symbol of 
Christianity by the fourth century, and it retains that 
meaning today.  But there are many contexts in which the 
symbol has also taken on a secular meaning.  Indeed, there 
are instances in which its message is now almost entirely 
secular.103   
Justice Alito stressed that the monument long had been 
present and to remove it would be hostility to religion.104  Justice 
Alito declared: “[t]he passage of time gives rise to a strong 
presumption of constitutionality.”105  
98. Id. at 616.
99. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2068 (2019).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2067.
102. Id. at 2069–70.
103. Id. at 2074 (footnote omitted).
104. Id. at 2084–85.
105. Id. at 2085.
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Justice Gorsuch concurred in the judgment and argued that no 
one has standing to challenge a religious symbol on government 
property on the basis of “‘offended observer’ theory”.106  He said that 
no one is sufficiently injured to permit a suit in federal court.107  He 
concluded that “suits like this one should be dismissed for lack of 
standing.”108  This, of course, would mean that the government can 
put any religious symbol it wants on any piece of government 
property and no federal court could stop it because, under Justice 
Gorsuch’s view, no one ever would have standing to challenge this. 
Justice Kavanaugh concurred and wrote separately to say that 
he believed that the Court had largely overruled the test from 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, a position long taken by those who advocate 
the accommodationist approach to the Establishment Clause.109  
He made clear that religious symbols on government property do 
not offend the Constitution: “[t]he practice of displaying religious 
memorials, particularly religious war memorials, on public land is 
not coercive and is rooted in history and tradition.”110 
Only Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor dissented.111  Justice 
Ginsburg expressed the view that a cross is the quintessential 
Christian religious symbol and the display of a thirty-two-foot cross 
on public property violates the Establishment Clause.112  She 
wrote:  
By maintaining the Peace Cross on a public highway, the 
Commission elevates Christianity over other faiths, and 
religion over nonreligion.  Memorializing the service of 
American soldiers is an “admirable and unquestionably 
secular” objective.  But the Commission does not serve that 
objective by displaying a symbol that bears “a starkly 
sectarian message.”113 
106. Id. at 2098 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2093 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2103 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 2104.
113. Id. (first quoting Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 715 (2005) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting); and then quoting Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 736 
(2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (citations omitted). 
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 From this case, and other recent decisions such as Town of 
Greece v. Galloway, it seems that there are now five justices—
Roberts, Thomas (who does not believe that the Establishment 
Clause applies to the states at all), Alito, Gorsuch, and 
Kavanaugh—to take the approach that the government violates the 
Establishment Clause only when it coerces religious participation 
or discriminates among religions in the distribution of benefits.114  
Rarely will the government be deemed to infringe this part of the 
First Amendment.  I have no doubt Justice Barrett will join them. 
In other words, there is a majority to allow the government to be 
aligned with Christianity, even without a declaration that the 
United States is officially a Christian nation. 
Second, there is a majority on the Court to grant broad 
exemptions to general laws—such as those requiring employers to 
provide contraceptives or forbidding discrimination based on sexual 
orientation—based on religious beliefs.  Also, this is a majority that 
is requiring the government to provide aid to religion when it 
provides it to secular institutions.  Two cases from June 2020 are 
revealing. 
Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue involved a 
Montana law that allowed parents sending their children to private 
school to receive a $150 tax credit.115  In Montana, most private 
schools are religious.116  The Montana Supreme Court had 
invalidated the tax credit law as violating the Montana State 
Constitution, which forbids direct or indirect government aid to 
religion.117 
That should have ended the matter.  The Montana tax credit 
program no longer existed; it could not be said that Montana was 
discriminating against religious institutions.  This was Justice 
Ginsburg’s key point in dissent: the Montana Supreme Court’s 
decision invalidated the entire tax credit program, so that no one 
receives any money for private schools, whether secular or 
114. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 591 (2014).
115. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2251 (2020).
116. Nina Totenberg & Brian Naylor, Supreme Court: Montana Can’t Ex-
clude Religious Schools From Scholarship Program, NPR (June 30, 2020), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/06/30/883074890/supreme-court-montana-cant-ex-
clude-religious-schools-from-scholarship-program [perma.cc/QLU8-XM9Y]. 
117. Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2253.
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religious.118  Therefore, Justice Ginsburg contended, no one is being 
treated differently based on religion, and there is no constitutional 
problem.119 
But the Supreme Court, five–four, concluded that the Montana 
Supreme Court violated free exercise of religion by invalidating the 
tuition program.120  Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion for the 
Court and said that the Montana Constitution prevented parents 
from receiving aid if they sent their children to religious as opposed 
to secular private schools.121  This, the Court concluded, violated 
free exercise of religion.122  The Court said that the government 
must have a compelling reason and no other alternative any time it 
denies benefits to religious institutions that it allows to secular 
ones.123 
Three years earlier, in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, 
Inc. v. Comer, the Court held that the State of Missouri violated the 
Free Exercise Clause when it gave secular private schools aid for 
playgrounds but denied the assistance to religious schools.124  The 
Court said it was “odious” to deny religious institutions benefits 
that go to secular ones and that strict scrutiny had to be met,125 but 
in a footnote the Court apparently cabined its holding to the facts 
before it (specifically, aid for “playground resurfacing”).126  Now the 
Court has made it clear that whenever the government gives 
benefits to secular private schools it must provide them to religious 
schools unless it can be shown that doing so would violate the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  And as explained 
above, very little will violate the Establishment Clause for the 
conservative justices on the Court. 
Prior to 2017, the Court had looked askance at challengers 
seeking to compel state governments to provide aid to religion 
118. Id. at 2280–81 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 2262–63 (majority opinion).
121. Id. at 2254.
122. Id. at 2262–63.
123. See id. at 2260–61.
124. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012,
2024 (2017). 
125. Id. at 2025.
126. Id. at 2023 n.3.
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under the guise of the Free Exercise Clause.127  Now a majority on 
the Court has found that the government is compelled to do so 
whenever it gives assistance to secular private institutions.128  
When President George W. Bush took office, he created an office of 
faith-based programs to facilitate churches, synagogues, and 
mosques receiving federal social service money.129  There was a 
debate among scholars and litigation in the courts as to whether 
the government may give this aid to religion or whether it violated 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.130  But now the 
Supreme Court has held that Constitution requires the government 
to provide aid to religious institutions when it provides benefits to 
secular ones.131  In a country where Christians are the largest 
religious group, there is no doubt that Christian denominations and 
their schools will be the primary beneficiaries. 
In addition to using the Free Exercise Clause as an 
unprecedented cudgel against state “no aid” (disestablishment) 
provisions, the conservatives have also deviated from long-standing 
precedent to use religious liberty to allow individuals to use their 
religion to impose great harm on others.  In 1990, in Employment 
Division v. Smith, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause 
cannot be used to challenge neutral laws of general applicability, 
no matter how much they burden religion, unless it can be shown 
that the government’s action is based on animus to religion.132  But 
the current Court has backed away from this approach and 
supports a much more robust protection of free exercise of religion. 
127. See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004) (holding that state
scholarship program for postsecondary education denying use of funds for the-
ological training did not run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause). 
128. See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2261 (2020).
129. Frank Bruni & Laurie Goodstein, New Bush Office Seeks Closer Ties
To Church, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/29/
us/new-bush-office-seeks-closer-ties-to-church-groups.html [perma.cc/83AB-
546R]. 
130. See generally Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587
(2007); Martha A. Boden, Compassion Inaction: Why President Bush’s Faith-
Based Initiatives Violate the Establishment Clause, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 991 
(2006); Elbert Lin et al., Faith in the Courts? The Legal and Political Future of 
Federally-Funded Faith-Based Initiatives, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 183 (2002). 
131. See Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2261.
132. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990).
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For instance, in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-
Berru, the Court ruled that elementary school teachers at a 
Catholic school could not sue for employment discrimination.133  
The two cases before the Court involved a teacher who sued for 
disability discrimination after losing her job following a diagnosis 
for breast cancer and a teacher who sued for age discrimination 
after being replaced by a younger instructor.134  
Previously, in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & 
School v. EEOC, the Court had only acknowledged a narrow 
exception that protected religions from being held liable for choices 
made with respect to “ministers,” because decisions regarding such 
officers necessarily implicate ecclesiastical questions that the 
government should not second guess.135  But now the Court has 
expanded it to all teachers, meaning that religious schools can 
discriminate with impunity based on race, sex, religion, sexual 
orientation, age, and disability.136  Again, overwhelmingly it is 
likely to be Christian schools, especially Catholic and evangelical 
Christian schools, that take advantage of this exemption from 
employment discrimination laws. 
The Free Exercise Clause is being used to undermine rights to 
nondiscriminatory treatment that people are entitled to in all other 
settings.  Ironically, the same conservative justices who, in 
Espinoza, stressed that religious schools should be treated the same 
as secular ones, in Our Lady of Guadalupe said that they should be 
treated differently with a broad exemption from anti-
discrimination laws.137 
In this way, the Court will act as if it were a Christian nation, 
even without so holding.  And in the 2020 October Term, the Court 
133. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2066
(2020). 
134. Id. at 2056–60.
135. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565
U.S. 171, 188–89 (2012). 
136. See Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S. Ct. at 2069.
137. Compare id. at 2069 (“When a school with a religious mission entrusts
a teacher with the responsibility of educating and forming students in the 
faith, judicial intervention into disputes between the school and teacher threat-
ens the school’s independence in a way that the First Amendment does not 
allow.”), with Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2261 (“A state need not subsidize private 
education.  But once a state decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private 
schools solely because they are religious.”).   
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has a case before it where it likely will expand religious exemptions 
from general laws, and perhaps even overrule Smith.138 
CONCLUSION 
Governments in the United States, to the greatest extent 
possible, should be secular.  Legally, the government should not be 
allowed to align with Christianity or any other religion.  Yet, I 
worry that the Supreme Court is moving very much in the opposite 
direction, effectively allowing the United States to be a Christian 
nation.  As I watch this process unfold, I am reminded of the words 
of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who said:  
By enforcing the [Religion] Clauses, we have kept religion 
a matter for the individual conscience, not for the 
prosecutor or bureaucrat.  At a time when we see around 
the world the violent consequences of the assumption of 
religious authority by government, Americans may count 
themselves fortunate: Our regard for constitutional 
boundaries has protected us from similar travails, while 
allowing private religious exercise to flourish. . . .  Those 
who would renegotiate the boundaries between church and 
state must therefore answer a difficult question: Why 
would we trade a system that has served us so well for one 
that has served others so poorly?139 
138. Fulton v. Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140
S. Ct. 1104 (2020) (No. 19-123).
139. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 882 (2005) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
